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ABSTRACT: This article presents five scenarios that might result
from a Russian coup de main in the Baltic region. The author
argues the North Atlantic Treaty Organization should analyze
force capabilities further to ensure Alliance nations can adequately
respond if Russia attacks across its border with Estonia and Latvia.

R

ussia’s annexation of Crimea, involvement in Donbas, and
support of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria have strained
the country’s relations with the West. Throughout this period of
increased tension, defense analysts from countries in the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) have explored ways to deter or defeat
additional acts of aggression committed by Russia. Current literature
covers a variety of topics such as conventional war scenarios, deterrence
strategies, cyber defense, countering political subversion, and the status of
Russia’s military.1 Through quantitative modeling, this article contributes
to this discussion by examining how variances in force employment and
size affect Russia’s chances of employing conventional warfare to expand
into the Baltic region.2
Although an open conflict between Russia and the West is unlikely
due to the escalation risks between states with nuclear weapons, should
a war erupt, it would most likely be fought along Russia’s border with
Estonia and Latvia.3 Within these nations reside many ethnic Russian
minorities who form enclaves similar to those Moscow “intervened” on
behalf of in the Ukraine. That intervention led NATO to enhance its
military presence in the region for deterrence purposes.4
One scenario suggests Russia may attempt to conquer the Baltic
countries with a hasty attack along its border. Such an operation would
1      Wesley Clark et al., Closing NATO’s Baltic Gap (Tallinn, Estonia: International Centre for
Defence and Security, 2016); Andrew Radin, Hybrid Warfare in the Baltics: Threats and Potential Responses
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017); Phillip Karber and Joshua Thibeault, “Russia’s
New-Generation Warfare,” Association of the United States Army, May 20, 2016; Timothy L.
Thomas, Russia Military Strategy: Impacting 21st Century Reform and Geopolitics (Fort Leavenworth; KS:
Foreign Military Studies Office, 2015); and Michael Connell and Sarah Vogler, Russia’s Approach to
Cyber Warfare (Arlington, VA: CNA, 2017).
2      Douglas Macgregor to the National Commission on the Future of the Army, “Competitive
Performance Analysis of US Army Brigade-Based Force and Alternative Force Design,
Reconnaissance Strike Group (RSG) in Baltic Warfighting Scenario,” September 7, 2015, National
Commission of the Future of the Army; Leszek Elak and Zdzisław Śliwa, “The Suwałki Gap:
NATO’s Fragile Hot Spot,” Zeszyty Naukowe AON 103, no. 2 (2016): 24–40; and David A. Schlapak
and Michael W. Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the
Baltics (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016).
3      R. Reed Anderson et al., Strategic Landpower and a Resurgent Russia: An Operational Approach to
Deterrence (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2016), 11–15; and “The Geopolitics of Russia:
Permanent Struggle,” Stratfor, April 15, 2012.
4      NATO, NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (Brussels: Public Diplomacy Division, 2017).
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likely be more tempting to Moscow than war after a deliberate buildup.5
Although the latter strategy would allow the superior strength of NATO
allies to be mobilized to defend its small members, a RAND study
argued the Alliance would suffer a quick defeat if Russia attempted the
former.6 Optimal force employment is one important factor to consider
in such analysis due to its impact on combat outcomes and its role in
determining regional military requirements.7 Better estimates of these
requirements can also reduce the probability of overcommitting scarce
security resources.
Based on the modeling, a forward-oriented defense would be
untenable. But NATO could prevent a coup de main from succeeding
with a different set of employment choices. These efforts would need to
include a defense arrayed in depth with positions minimally exposed to
observation and a large force kept in reserve. Stopping Russia’s offensive
may require ceding parts of Estonia’s and Latvia’s eastern territories as
well as maintaining soldiers at a high state of readiness to implement
complex force-employment choices. Additionally, if Russia increases
its available strength by keeping more units near its western border or
acquiring more personnel, NATO defenders could still be overrun.
Because Russia appears to be taking such actions while also modernizing
its military, additional NATO forces and improved weaponry will likely
be needed in the near future.

Modeling Choice and Explanation

Civilian researchers often lack access to sophisticated computer
programs and to wargaming models used by military and defense
contractors since the 1980s.8 Of the options publicly available, many
treat questions of force employment implicitly or offer few variables.9
Although less detailed and precise than sophisticated computer models
used by the Pentagon, Michael E. O’Hanlon explains comparatively
simpler models can make up for this shortcoming by “requiring a user
to think pragmatically, historically, and intuitively about the modeling
enterprise—rather than running the risk of getting lost in the math.” 10
Thus, this article draws from Stephen Biddle’s Military Power, which
explains how increasingly lethal weaponry made mass movement in the
open impossible, or at best very costly, by the early twentieth century.
5      John W. Nicholson, “NATO’s Land Forces: Speed and Strength Matter,” Prism 6, no. 2
(2016): 31.
6      Schlapak and Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence. For a counterargument and rebuttal, see Michael
Kofman, “Fixing NATO Deterrence in the East Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love
NATO’s Crushing Defeat By Russia,” War on the Rocks, May 12, 2016; and Karl Mueller et al., “In
Defense of a Wargame: Bolstering Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank,” War on the Rocks, June
14, 2016.
  7      Force employment refers to the operational concepts, doctrine, and tactics used by militaries.
8      John A. Battilega and Judith K. Grange, eds., The Military Applications of Modeling (WrightPatterson Air Force Base, OH: Air Force Institute of Technology Press, 1984).
9      The combat model of COL Trevor N. Dupuy, US Army retired, does not have force
employment explicitly counted despite a broad array of variables. Joshua Epstein’s work at the
Brookings Institution only has the attacker’s rate of advance and the defender’s rate of withdrawal as
force employment variables. Trevor N. Dupuy, Numbers, Predictions, and War: Using History to Evaluate
Combat Factors and Predict the Outcome of Armed Conflict (Fairfax, VA: Hero Books, 1985); and Joshua
M. Epstein, The Calculus of Conventional War: Dynamic Analysis without Lanchester Theory (Washington,
DC: Brookings Institution, 1985), 21–22.
10      Michael E. O’Hanlon, The Science of War: Defense Budgeting, Military Technology, Logistics, and
Combat Outcomes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 72.
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As a consequence, combatants adopted a series of force employment
techniques that created a strategy of a “tightly interrelated complex of
cover, concealment, dispersion, suppression, small-unit independent
maneuver, and combined arms at the tactical level, and depth, reserves,
and differential concentration at the operational level of war.” 11 While
this system, or major elements of it, can lead to better combat outcomes,
it is not synonymous with good practice. Instead, surviving modern
firepower requires trade-offs. Additionally, the complexity of this system
makes it difficult for unskilled soldiers to implement.
Biddle’s aggregate and deterministic representation, which explains
how force employment affects the outcome of continental warfare,
measures technological sophistication with a weighted average of the
years tanks and combat aircraft were introduced for the two combatants.
This article adds factors for anti-tank weapons and armored vehicles to
provide a more accurate metric for the equipment likely to be deployed
in contemporary Baltic scenarios.
Although this method does not provide a level of detail equal to
computer simulations, it is a viable option for allowing a single person
to make computations while accounting for numerous, quantifiable
variances in force employment. Moreover, this model can help predict
the likelihood of a defender containing an offensive before it manages
to break through the depth of the defensive positions. If the offensive
is likely to be contained, the amount of ground gained by the attacker
can be calculated. The approach also provides outputs for casualties,
territorial gains, and campaign duration based on changes in variables.
The model assumes breakthroughs, which provide an attacker with
the chance to gain ground at low cost, lead to high defender casualties
and territorial loss, but without specific quantities. Such feats can give
the attacker control of the entire theater of operations as, once past
the main defenses, the force moves quickly in the open to envelope
or isolate forward deployed defenders. Additionally, the attacker can
sever the defender from supporting units needed for sustainment. In
this situation, defenders fight with greatly reduced effectiveness, devolve
into panic and disorder, or even surrender.12

Force-Employment Variables

The model allows attackers to change the force employment variables
of assault frontage and the velocity of his forces’ assault with differing
effects based on chapter 3 and the appendix of Military Power. Assault
frontage is the width of the theater in which the attacker conducts an
offensive operation. Narrower frontages allow the attacker to achieve
a greater ratio of forces at the point of attack, which allows an offensive
to penetrate deeper with all else equal. Drawbacks of narrower assault
frontages include greater vulnerability to counteroffensives that threaten
the attacker’s lines of communication, resupply, and reinforcements
due to fewer avenues for rapid movement. These frontages may also

11      Stephen D. Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2004), 3.
12      Biddle, Military Power, 42–44; and Christopher Bellamy, The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare:
Theory and Practice (New York: Routledge, 2016), 17–21.
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require an attacker to echelon units for the dispersion characteristic of
modern tactics.
Velocity of assault refers to the attacker’s net attempted rate of
advance during an offensive. A lower assault velocity provides attackers
with greater opportunity to implement modern system tactics. Furtive
and dispersed movement, reconnaissance, and coordinating suppressive
fire, are time-consuming actions. Ceteris paribus, lower assault velocities
provide an attacker the ability to take a given amount of ground with
fewer casualties or to expend a given number of casualties for more
ground. Slower assault velocities have the cost of giving the defender
more time to counterconcentrate against an offensive.
In terms of force employment, defenders can modify the fraction
of their forward deployed forces exposed, the depth of their defensive
positions, the velocity at which their forces in reserve move, and the
fraction of their forces kept in reserve. The fraction of forward garrison
exposed represents the vulnerability of the defenders not held in reserve.
Given the lethality of modern weaponry, it is important to disperse
defending soldiers in concealed, covered fighting positions. There is no
incentive to increase exposure. But preparing defenses is a challenging
task attempted with varying degrees of success.
Greater defensive depth extends the time an attacker needs to
implement modern forces and it provides more time to concentrate
against an offensive. Likewise, holding more forces in reserve results in
more defenders for counterconcentration. At higher values, these two
variables affect the attacker’s ability to achieve a breakthrough and to
make territorial gains.

Scenario Overview

The scenarios identified here involve a Russian offensive that begins
after a period of hasty mobilization. Russia launches the offensive
from its shared borders with Estonia and Latvia combined with minor
attacks and demonstrations. The primary metrics are Russia’s projected
territorial gains regardless of the ability to break through NATO’s
defenses. If Russian troops achieve a breakthrough, it is assumed they
take most of the Baltic territory. This article focuses on a coup de main
scenario over one week and does not necessarily deny Russia the ability
to make further advances during a prolonged campaign.
Several assumptions simplify the scenarios. First, the Russian
ground units in the Kaliningrad oblast are not explored since 4 brigades
from Polish and NATO reaction forces are assumed to defend the line
of communications and the Suwałki Gap as well as reduce or contain
offensive forces within the enclave. Because Russia has 3 maneuver
brigades in that region when fully mobilized, the larger Allied forces
are presumed at least able to contain any ground offensives originating
in the enclave.13
Second, in the short period of one week and with air forces of
comparable size, neither side is expected to achieve air superiority, to
engage in a one-sided preliminary bombardment of the other, or to
13      Gudrun Persson, ed., Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective—2016 (Stockholm:
FOI, 2016), 81.
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achieve full deployment of all planned formations in the region. Because
the opposing air forces will attempt to defeat their counterparts, neither
combatant is likely to provide disproportionate air support to its ground
forces within ten days postmobilization.14
The defined structures for Russia’s and NATO’s three progressively
larger forces are based on recent and projected trends for expanding
the strength of each combatant in the Baltic region. The depth of the
defenses and the fraction of the defender’s forward garrison exposed
comprise the defender’s variables of force employment. The attacker’s
variables include the width and velocity of assault, which will vary based
on the defender’s choices and the attacker’s campaign objectives. To
attempt a breakthrough, the attacker chooses a narrow width of assault
and the slowest velocity of assault that allows a breakthrough within six
days. This maneuver assumes the Russian exploitation on the seventh day
begins the collapse of NATO’s theater defense. In scenarios with limited
aims, the attacker utilizes an increased width of assault to account for
consolidating the defense of territorial gains and an assault velocity that
will maximize territorial gain within seven days.
The width of the theater, a variable used for the model, is the total
length of Estonia’s and Latvia’s borders with Russia. Including onethird of the length of the large lake border between Russia and Estonia
accounts for an observation force and reduces the bias created with no
NATO coverage in this area. Some of these troops could also be diverted
to guard against disruptions from Russian infiltrators behind the front.

14      For similar reasoning by the RAND Corporation, see Schlapak and Johnson, Reinforcing
Deterrence, 6.
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Scenario 1. NATO’s Defense versus Russia’s Invasion (2016)

The first scenario considers the force sizes and the equipment of
the two combatants in 2016, which provides an analysis of how NATO
might have performed shortly after Russia invaded Ukraine. If NATO’s
defense at these force levels is successful, the Alliance could likely
reduce its manpower in the Baltic, if Russia did so as well. Regarding the
orders of battle, 11 active duty combat battalions in Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania are mobilized. The United States deploys 3 light battalions and
a reinforced Stryker battalion, while the United Kingdom musters an
airborne battalion. From its Western Military District, Russia mobilizes
5 motorized infantry, 5 mechanized infantry, 8 airborne infantry, and 4
tank battalions.
Regardless of exposure, a defensive depth of 10 kilometers is
inadequate for preventing a breakthrough. Additionally, the attacker can
break through defenses prepared 30 kilometers deep except when there
is low defensive exposure. Even then, advances extend into the last 3
kilometers, which given the deterministic nature of the model, suggests
a breakthrough would still be plausible. Albeit narrowly at higher levels
of exposure, 50 kilometers of defenses result in a contained offensive. In
the case of limited aims offensives, the attacker can also break through
against shallow defenses. Against deeper defenses, the attacker can be
contained after an advance of 17–29 kilometers.
These results suggest that in 2016, the Baltic states would have
been in danger even with the technology acquired since NATO began
reacting to Russian aggression in Europe. Russia would have struggled
to defeat a modern system defense with high depth and low exposure but
could have achieved a breakthrough in most other cases. Alliance units
would have to have been well-trained in implementing complex modern
system techniques and have had their preparations completed on short
notice, though. Furthermore, this outcome suggests that unless Moscow
makes notable reductions in its western units and their readiness, NATO
cannot reduce its own strength without risk. Russia has few feasible
objectives for a limited offensive. There are few large towns in the
eastern Baltics, with the exception of Narva, in Ida-Virumaa County, on
the northeastern isthmus of Estonia.15

Scenario 2. NATO’s Defense versus Russia’s Expanded Capabilities (2017)

The second scenario examines NATO’s ability to defend against
a coup de main given the status of Russia’s military buildup before
2017 without an expanded force on short notice nor further efforts of
modernization. Changes to the Russian order of battle reflect raising 3
new divisions, partly from currently existing brigades, in the Western
Military District.16 Expected to have 4 maneuver regiments each, two
divisions of the reformed Guards Tank Army are near full strength
and 2–3 divisions are in early development. This article considers the
third, an armored division, will also be raised and fully manned or
15      Ene Narusk and Liis Haugas, eds., Regional Development in Estonia 2014 (Tallinn, Estonia:
Statistics Estonia, 2014); and “Estonia: Administrative Division,” City Population, accessed
November 12, 2017.
16      Michael Kofman, “Russia’s New Divisions in the West,” Russia Military Analysis (blog), May 7,
2016; Michael Peck, “Next Stop Berlin? Moscow’s Nazi-Killing Tank Unit Is Back,” National Interest
142 (April 1, 2016); and “Chapter 5: Russia and Eurasia,” Military Balance 117, no. 1 (2017): 218–21.
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that high-readiness armored forces from neighboring districts will be
available. These additions will allow Russia to mobilize the following
additional battalions in time for the scenario: 3 tank, 2 motorized
infantry, 1 mechanized infantry, and 1 airborne. infantry. Russian forces
also have more modern equipment, such as larger numbers of AT-13
anti-tank missiles rather than AT-7s.
With this model, combinations of defensive depths and force
exposure levels fail to contain a breakthrough attempt—except at
depths of 50 kilometers and lower exposure. Even then, the attacker
comes close to a breakthrough, suggesting a contained offensive would
not be guaranteed. The capability of a limited aims offensive improves
modestly, allowing Russia to advance a few more kilometers. Viable
objectives, however, remain outside easy reach. Shallow defenses
allow these limited offensives to achieve breakthrough, much as in the
first scenario.
These results indicate NATO needed to expand the Baltic capability
that was in place by the end of 2016 to provide an adequate defense
of Estonia and Latvia. Even with well-trained and prepared soldiers,
a Russian invasion on short notice before that expansion could have
overrun large swathes of the Baltic countries.

Scenario 3. NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence versus Russia’s Expanded
Capabilities (2018)

This scenario examines the defense of NATO’s current force, with
an enhanced forward presence and units being raised by the Baltic
countries, against a Russian coup de main.17 Russia’s order of battle is the
same as in the previous scenario. The NATO force is augmented by a US
Army armored brigade as well as formations from NATO’s enhanced
Forward Presence battlegroups for each Baltic country.18 These units
serve as a deterrent to Russian aggression in Eastern Europe, promising
full Alliance participation in the event of a conflict.
The scenario portrayed in table 1 indicates breakthrough would
only occur when the defensive depths are at 10 kilometers. The invasion
is halted before penetrating into the deeper defensive positions. This
scenario suggests NATO’s current strength in the Baltics could defeat a
Russian coup de main, and that no radical increases are needed for the
near future. Furthermore, the defense could be successful with lower
levels of readiness and training than the other scenarios, allowing more
room for error. With limited aims, a Russian offensive could be halted
with a forward-oriented posture and low levels of exposure. Such force
employment by the defenders would be risky, though, as a breakthrough
attempt could still penetrate shallow defenses. Otherwise, the ground
gain of the invader is less than in previous scenarios, and few objectives
are within reach in those cases.
17      Srivari Aishwarya, Estonia To Invest in Ammunition and Armaments for Its 2nd Infantry
Brigade, Army Technology, March 13, 2017; and “A New Brigade Named Žemaitija Is Established
within the Lithuanian Armed Forces in Western Lithuania,” Lithuanian Armed Forces, December
31, 2015.
18      NATO, NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence; John Vandiver, “New Tank Brigade Arrives in
Europe for Mission in the East,” Stars and Stripes, September 13, 2017; and “Boosting NATO’s
Presence in the East and Southeast,” NATO, accessed August 11, 2017.
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Table 1. Outcomes of NATO Enhanced Forward Presence versus
Russia’s Expanded Force (2018)
Breakthrough Attempt
Fraction
of Forward
Garrison
Exposed

Depth of
Forward
Defenses

Width of
Assault

Velocity of
Assault

Ground
Gained by
Attacker

Breakthrough

Depth, width, velocity, and ground in kilometers per day (km/day)

0.10
0.10
0.10
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.40
0.40
0.40

10
30
50
10
30
50
10
30
50

5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

1.67
5.00
8.33
1.67
5.00
8.33
1.67
5.00
8.33

14.23
18.82
20.12
16.95
22.35
23.87
20.93
27.50
29.34

Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No

Limited Aims Offensive
Fraction of
Forward
Garrison
Exposed

Depth of
Forward
Defenses

Width of
Assault

Velocity of
Assault

Ground
Gained by
Attacker

0.10
10
15
1.2
7.55
0.10
30
15
2.0
13.45
0.10
50
15
2.6
17.26
0.25
10
15
1.3
8.70
0.25
30
15
2.2
15.35
0.25
50
15
2.9
19.53
0.40
10
15
1.5
10.02
0.40
30
15
2.6
17.38
0.40
50
15
3.3
22.49
*For each case, 50 percent of defenders are in reserve, moving at a velocity of 20 km/day.
Year Major Weapon Systems Introduced
Combat Maneuver
Personnel
(Weighted Mean)
Aggressor
11,600
1985.4
Defender
11,870
1985.2
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Scenario 4. NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence versus Russia’s Planned
Capabilities (2020)

The fourth scenario involves NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence
and a liberal estimate of the Russian army’s strength in 2020. Russia’s
force structure notably includes all of the planned divisions in the
Western Military District and the largest plausible unit rosters. The
two divisions in the 1st Guards Tank Army and the airborne forces are
assumed to be at a high state of readiness, able to mobilize more units for
the invasion. These factors add an airborne battalion, 3 tank battalions,
2 mechanized infantry battalions, and 2 motorized infantry battalions.
Although the newest ground combat vehicles, the T-14 Armata main
battle tank and T-15 Bagulnik infantry fighting vehicle, are also capable
of participating in the offensive, the costs combined with Russia’s recent
economic troubles suggest that only select units will receive them.19
At this strength, the invaders can break through shallow defenses
regardless of the defender’s exposure. At depths of 30 kilometers, the
Russian attack leads to breakthrough in all but the lowest defender
exposure levels. Even then, the offensive is contained less than one
kilometer away from a breakthrough. A defensive depth of 50 kilometers
leads to a contained offensive in all cases. The territorial gain from
limited aims offensives are similar to those in the previous scenarios.
Few major objectives are in easy reach, and any NATO attempt to limit
the advance with a forward-oriented defense risks a breakthrough.
These outcomes suggest that even if Russia achieves its military
buildup goals, an aggressive use of modern system force employment by
the defenders could halt the attack. Consequently, an urgent need for
NATO to strengthen its Baltic defenses further is absent even though
modernizing weaponry, increasing force structures, improving readiness
levels, and expanding training for soldiers would be wise.

Scenario 5. NATO’s Expanded Forward Presence versus Russia’s Planned
Capabilities (2020)

In the fifth scenario, NATO expands its force structure to counter
a Russian coup de main attempted in 2020 after Moscow’s planned
buildup. To the Alliance effort, the Baltic countries add 3 new maneuver
battalions, and the United States contributes an additional armored
brigade, which would bring the strength of America’s ground forces
in Europe to pre-2013 levels.20 Other NATO members with a large
population and defense budget—such as France, Germany, or the
United Kingdom—could also provide the additional brigade. Russia’s
order of battle remains the same as in the fourth scenario. The NATO
effort also benefits from improved weapon systems such as additional
Javelin anti-tank missiles, CV90 infantry fighting vehicles, and Spike
anti-tank missiles.21 The results shown in table 2 indicate NATO can
contain this Russian offensive when its defenses are 50 kilometers deep
even with relatively exposed defenders.
19      “Armata Main Battle Tank,” Military-Today, accessed July 26, 2018.
20      John Vandiver, “Pentagon Lays Out Significant Cuts to U.S. Forces in Europe,” Stars and
Stripes, February 16, 2012.
21      “First IFVs Arrive in Estonia,” Postimees, October 7, 2016; Thomas Newdick, “Fearing
Russia, One of Europe’s Smallest Armies Just Bought a Bunch of Armored Vehicles,” War Is
Boring, September 19, 2014.
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Table 2. Outcomes of NATO Expanded Force versus Russia’s
Planned Force (2020)
Breakthrough Attempt
Fraction of
Forward
Garrison
Exposed

Depth of
Forward
Defenses

Width of
Assault

Velocity of
Assault

Ground
Gained by
Attacker

Breakthrough

Depth, width, velocity, and ground in kilometers per day (km/day)

0.10
0.10
0.10
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.40
0.40
0.40

10
30
50
10
30
50
10
30
50

5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

1.67
5.00
8.33
1.67
5.00
8.33
1.67
5.00
8.33

15.87
20.93
22.36
18.90
24.87
26.55
23.36
30.63
32.66

Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No

Limited Aims Offensive
Fraction of
Depth of
Width of
Velocity of
Ground
Forward
Forward
Assault
Assault
Gained by
Garrison
Defenses
Attacker
Exposed
0.10
10
15
1.20
8.40
0.10
30
15
2.10
14.65
0.10
50
15
2.80
18.58
0.25
10
15
1.40
9.30
0.25
30
15
2.40
16.33
0.25
50
15
3.10
20.99
0.40
10
15
1.60
10.70
0.40
30
15
2.70
18.89
0.40
50
15
3.50
24.17
*For each case, 50 percent of defenders are in reserve, moving at a velocity of 20 km/day.
Combat Maneuver
Year Major Weapon Systems Introduced
Personnel
(Weighted Mean)
Aggressor
15,120
1991.3
Defender
14,220
1988.3
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The invasion could also be halted earlier by using defenses 30 kilometers
deep with low levels of exposure. As previously identified, the shallow
defenses failed to prevent a breakthrough. In the event of a limited aims
offensive, a defensive depth of 10 kilometers leads to breakthrough
only with exposed defensive positions. Most other combinations lead
to advances of 14–25 kilometers. A moderate defensive depth of 30
kilometers leads to the attacker gaining less than 20 kilometers of
ground. That depth combined with low exposure levels could prevent
a breakthrough while limiting the territorial gain of a limited offensive.
Thus, with a moderate expansion, NATO can be prepared to defend
against even an optimistic Russian offensive.

Modeling Results

In nearly every case examined during this modeling, Russia
penetrated a forward-oriented NATO posture. Considering the size of
the theater and the small defensive force, this outcome is unsurprising.
The advantage of such a posture is the chance to reduce territorial gain
if the offensive can be contained. Also in most cases, a defense deployed
in depth, with limited exposure, and with a large force in reserve,
managed to contain the offensive. In scenarios involving the stated force
employment options and higher disparities in numbers or equipment,
containment succeeds by narrower margins. Limited offensives were
less promising for Russia. Regardless of force structure, they could not
advance more than 35 kilometers in a week. Neither Estonia nor Latvia
has many cities near their border with Russia. Because of this, there are
few lucrative targets worth attempting a limited aims offensive, except
possibly the northeastern region of Estonia.
The results lead to several suggestions regarding NATO force
employment and structure in the Baltics. First, NATO should consider
adopting a defensive concept of operations that includes a combination of
well-concealed defensive positions arrayed in depth and a large fraction
of forces in reserve. Specifically, the operational concept would attempt
to force a Russian invasion either to proceed at a pace too slow to defeat
NATO before reinforcements can arrive or to make an exposed rush
that becomes too costly to sustain. This approach would sacrifice more
ground if Russia attempted a limited offensive, but it offers a strong
possibility of containing a breakthrough offensive that could collapse
NATO’s defense theater wide. Even in the event of a limited offensive,
most of the Baltic territory could be held. Lacking the ability to overrun
Estonia and Latvia quickly, while also having few feasible objectives for
a limited offensive, Russian aggression could be defeated or deterred.
Regarding force structure, modeling suggests NATO’s strength in
the Baltic region, the availability of immediate reinforcements, and the
expansion of regional armies are currently adequate. As Russia expands
its military strength in the region, though, this status could change. As
long as Russia adds and modernizes units in its western region, more
NATO troops with increasingly better equipment will be required to
contain an offensive at safe margins. If Russia follows through with
its military expansion plans through the 2020s, however, major NATO
powers will need to contribute more forces.
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Examining Other Factors

Other variables that could influence combat outcomes in the Baltic
region should also be considered. Equipment differences, for example,
could result in NATO’s predominately light forces, which lack the
tactical mobility, firepower, and protection that Russia’s mechanized
units have, being pinned down and outmaneuvered while struggling to
damage the attacker’s armored vehicles.22 Additionally, NATO’s limited
quantities of land-based fires and air defense assets, in comparison to
Russian formations, could be an issue in a scenario where the Alliance
has not gained air superiority. Finally, concerns may arise that the low
force-to-space ratio of NATO troops could not halt an attacker due to
the low concentration of soldiers and porous defenses.23
While these are reasonable concerns, these factors are unlikely to
cause radically different combat outcomes. The Baltic countries are
buying new advanced anti-tank missiles, armored transport vehicles,
artillery, and air defense systems that contribute to NATO’s military
effort to modernize equipment. More land-based fires, counterbattery
capabilities, and air defense units, however, would still be helpful.
Additionally, the rough, wooded terrain of the eastern Baltics could
partially negate some of the advantages of mechanized units.24
Although the force-to-space ratio for NATO would be low by
historic standards, it would still be plausible.25 In 2006, for instance,
a brigade-sized light infantry force of Hezbollah fighters defended
southern Lebanon with 5.5 soldiers per square kilometer.26 Hezbollah
provided fierce resistance against a larger Israeli force with armored
units. After surviving weeks of aerial bombardment, Hezbollah still
prevented the Israel Defense Force from advancing more than 20–25
kilometers in 72 hours.27 In the early phases of Operation Desert Shield,
the American military planned to defend against a larger Iraqi army over
an area of more than 36,000 square kilometers and 200 kilometers depth
with 4 divisions, three of which were not heavily mechanized.28 The
suggested force employment in the Baltics would involve a density of
roughly two soldiers per square kilometer.29 This distribution would be
thinner than the examples above, but not drastically so. Additionally, the
rough terrain in the western Baltics would require an attacker to be more
reliant on roads for fast movement, providing defenders with a chance to
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concentrate on those avenues of approach. Thus, there is little reason to
believe a low force-to-space ratio would significantly alter the outcome.

Recommendations

Preparing NATO forces to conduct a defensive operation with
a complex force employment scheme similar to the one described
above would demand a high level of readiness and extensive training.
The forward defenders need to provide an early warning for the main
defenses and delay the attackers. They would have to select and create
concealed fighting positions with covered routes of retreat.30 The force
would execute challenging military tasks such as delaying actions and
withdrawals as well.31 These decisions demand judgment about when to
retreat to avoid being overrun, how to slow down the attacking force, and
how to coordinate fires to cover the withdrawal. The forces in reserve
must move significant distances while minimizing casualties from deep
strikes and then conduct a counterattack.32 The skills needed for these
tasks can be learned only with extensive practice. All Alliance countries
need to invest the necessary resources to ensure their contingents
maintain or acquire the required level of proficiency.
If NATO forces decide to plan a defense of the Baltics based on
the conclusions above, there are several avenues for further research.
Defense strategists should use additional modeling and simulation,
perhaps at finer levels of detail, to test, specify, and modify the concept
of operations. Strategists must study the rates at which NATO and
Russia could send reinforcements to the region. Even if a coup de main is
prevented, the Baltics could still be overrun if the Alliance cannot quickly
mobilize relief forces. The Alliance should examine the conditions for
expanding its regional deterrent to maintain credibility. Finally, the
allied militaries must ensure they have the skills and readiness needed
to conduct a complex campaign on short notice. Most notably, force
employment warrants additional study in analyzing a potential Baltic
conflict. Material factors may be easier to quantify, but the nonmaterial
can have as much, or even more, influence on the outcomes of battle.
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